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Augustine’s The City o f God is a foundational theological text for the development of 
Christian thought across time. Over the centuries, political scientists and theologians have been 
especially interested in this text in a variety of ways, but for the purposes of this discussion, the 
focus will be on Books I-V and Book XIX. Typically, theologians have been interested in 
Augustine’s rebuttal of pagan claims that are found in the first five books, while political 
scientists focus most of their attention on Book XIX for its discussion of the highest ends of the 
state through the means of politics in a context characterized by fallen humanity. Studying the 
arguments set forth in these two sections independently of one another has proved to produce 
valuable additions to both theological and political science scholarship; however, by ignoring the 
other sections, scholars will have a limited understanding of Augustine’s view on the highest 
good. It is essential to read Books I-V and Book XIX in light of one another because Augustine 
is filling in the gaps in his own arguments; because The City o f God was a work that was 
developed over thirteen years, it is absolutely necessary for theologians and political scientists to 
have read both portions of the text, so they are able to understand the full meaning of 
Augustine’s completed arguments.
Placing Augustine in Context
The Establishment of Christianity in the Later Roman Empire
Before leaping into the complex arguments of The City o f God, it is important to 
understand the historical context in which Augustine is developing his rebuttals against the 
pagans. Before Augustine’s lifetime, Constantine the Great ruled the Roman Empire from 306 to 
327 CE. In 311, Galerius, the emperor who ruled jointly with Constantine, “issued the Edict of 
Serdica granting freedom of worship to all Christians” (Grant 230). Ironically, Galerius is
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remembered as being “the most enthusiastic persecutor of Christians,” but in the end, he 
reluctantly accepted that Christianity was an unstoppable force -  this persecution had lasted eight 
years, and the Christians had not admitted defeat (Aland 75). While the first edict was intended 
to end the persecution of Christians, the persecutions did not fully end until the Edict of Milan 
was passed in 313 by Constantine. It is important to note that the Edict of Milan went beyond 
what was achieved through the Edict of Serdica (Aland 76). It granted the Christian Church 
equal rights with pagan cults, and it assured Christians that they would no longer be persecuted 
for their belief. Furthermore, all of the property that was confiscated during the persecutions for 
the last decade would be returned. In his work, Augustine boasts of God’s faithfulness to 
Constantine, claiming that God gave him “such fullness of earthly gifts as no one would even 
dare wish for” (160). Unlike the first edict, Constantine’s Edict of Milan made Christianity equal 
to the pagan cults in the eyes of the state, which ultimately gave Christianity the recognition it 
needed to later become the established state religion. Theodosius the Great (who is “presented as 
a model Christian prince in the City o f God [Volz and Watkins; Brown 291]) passed the Edict of 
Thessalonica in 380. It was commanded that “all the nations which are governed by [Roman] 
clemency and moderation should steadfastly adhere to the religion which was taught by Saint 
Peter to the Romans” (Volz and Watkins). With this edict, and later edicts, Theodosius revoked 
the right for any other forms of worship within the empire; now, all citizens were required to 
worship the god of Christianity (Volz and Watkins). These edicts were important for the freedom 
and authority granted to Augustine when he was installed as the Bishop of Hippo in 396 (Van 
der Meer 9). Without Constantine brining about the official end of Christianity’s persecution 
throughout the empire and Theodosius’ making Christianity the only established religion, it is 
likely that it would have been impossible for Augustine to have the proper occasion for writing
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The City o f God in the first place. It is important to keep this transition in mind before engaging 
Augustine’s arguments for this reason: now that the Christian god is Rome’s official god, the 
pagans held Christ to be responsible for the security of the empire. Furthermore, the Christian 
Church also began to function in a civic role that it had not previously had because before the 
Christian god was the state’s god, the Roman Pantheon was understood to be the protectors of 
Rome that ordered society.
Augustine Contra Pelagius
According to the Encyclopedia o f Early Christianity, Augustine’s writings were largely 
shaped by schisms in Christianity, political and social calamity and three great controversies: 
Manichaeism, Donatism and Pelagianism, which “can all be understood as conflicts over 
‘anthropologies’” or views of the natural human disposition (Ferguson 122). The most important 
controversy, for the sake of this discussion is Pelagianism. Historically, “it was an ascetic 
movement composed of disparate elements united under the name of the British theologian 
Pelagius, who taught in Rome in the later 4th and 5th” centuries (Livingstone). Those who 
adhered to what would ultimately become a heretical position “denied [Adam’s] transmission of 
Original Sin” and believed that “the individual is improvable beyond the limits of a fallen 
condition through education” (Livingstone; Stock 18). In other words, Pelagius “began to teach 
that it was possible -  and therefore mandatory -  that human beings strive towards and achieve 
perfection in the Christian life in the present” (Ferguson 124). In a similar way, so-called pagan 
philosophers such as Aristotle and Cicero argue that humankind obtains the highest good in the 
city through the public activity of politics -  the highest good for these philosophers is 
eudaimonia or human flourishing. Both the philosophers and Pelagius deny the transmission of 
original sin insofar as the limits placed upon humankind by sin are disregarded by both -  while
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Pelagius explicitly denies the effects of sin, the pagans only do so implicitly because they’re 
oblivious to it. Pelagius preached “up human merits to such an extent as to declare that a man has 
them of his own very self” (Mourant 314-315). Ferguson regards this tradition as the third 
“lengthy intellectual and ecclesiastical battle in the context of which Augustine’s theological 
ideas were formulated, especially those on predestination, original sin, and grace” (124). In his 
organized rebuttal of Pelagianism, “he neatly reduces [it] to three grave errors: to think that God 
redeems according to some scale of human merit; to imagine that some human beings are 
actually capable of a sinless life; to suppose that the descendants of the first human beings to sin 
are themselves born innocent” (Wetzel 52). This controversy within Christian Latinity is what 
prepares Augustine for his rebuttal of the pagans in The City o f God; it is through humankind’s 
lack of understanding of their own fallen state that Augustine is building his arguments upon. 
Augustine on Original Sin and the Fall of Humankind
Augustine’s “philosophical understanding of the [human] will is interwoven with his 
interpretation o f” the theological doctrine of original sin (Kretzmann and Stump 6). The “Fall of 
Man” that is found in the book of Genesis is what “ushered into the world original sin, which is 
not an event but rather a condition. It is the condition imposed by God as punishment on Adam 
and Eve for disobedience” (Mann 47); their disobedience was manifest in their prideful 
replacement of “the selfless love of God [by] love of self” (O’Donnell 51). Augustine’s 
understanding of the Fall of Man (i.e. the reformed doctrine of original sin) lines up with the 
Pauline view of humans being totally depraved. The condition of total depravity is innate 
because it is inherited through the bloodline of Adam and Eve -  which includes every human 
being -  and is characterized by: “dispossession from a naturally perfect environment, the loss of 
natural immortality and the acquisition of susceptibility to physical pain, fatigue, disease, aging,
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and rebellious bodily disorders, especially sexual lust” (Mann 47). One of Augustine’s favored 
theses that he used to combat Pelagianism, states that “the cause of moral evil, of sin, is the 
perverse will of the creature. There is no antecedent, efficient cause of this evil will” (Bourke 
264-265). To be totally depraved, is to have a will that is immoral or wicked; it is through a 
totally fallen will that humans engage the world, and because they do not have a good will, their 
view of the highest good is depraved too. Having established a proper context for the arguments 
that St. Augustine makes in his work, it is now appropriate to explore Augustine’s response to 
the pagans and discover why it brings value to the study of The City o f  God, using both theology 
and political science.
Augustine’s Response to the Pagans
In the first five books of The City o f God, readers find Augustine beginning his rebuttal 
against the pagans’ claim that outlawing pagan worship and establishing the Christian god as the 
sole god of Rome now makes Him responsible for the security of the Empire; furthermore, the 
pagans argue that the sack of Rome in 410 demonstrates that Rome is now worse off because of 
the prohibition of pagan worship. Because Rome collapsed while Christ ought to be protecting 
the nation, it is clear, to the pagans, that the Christian god is weaker than the Roman gods. 
Augustine fiercely rebuts the pagans’ argument that Rome’s fall calls Christ’s power into 
question using his theological understanding of history.
Augustine’s first pair of arguments are spread across the first five books of The City o f 
God. In Book I, Augustine begins, in the preface, by stating that his purpose is to undertake the 
defense of the City of God “against those who prefer their own gods to the Founder o f” the City 
of God (3). Following his explanation of the purpose of the work, Augustine introduces the City 
of Man as a city “ruled by its lust to rule” (3). With this initial characterization of the City of
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Man, the reader is now aware of a few things: the aim of the City of Man is domination, it holds 
other nations in enslavement and it is enslaved to its own lust to rule. All of these things are 
unjust because they accomplish one end only: raising up the powerful. This view comes as a 
result of Augustine’s understanding of the depraved nature of humankind. Augustine states that 
those, impiously mad and ungratefully prideful, people that were spared by the invaders were 
just pretending to be Christians as a means of self-preservation (4). Those who blamed Christ for 
the sack of Rome deserve any suffering they endured because they are wicked -  as a result of 
their depravity -  and all worshipers of the pagan gods are at fault for their own demise because 
God was justly exacting His punishment of the pagans through the use of the invading force 
(Augustine 6-7).
Augustine recognizes that both believers and unbelievers suffered as a result of the sack 
of Rome; in fact, he claims that “God has willed that [the good things of this life, and its ills,] 
should be common to both” the City of Man and the City of God (10). However, he wants to 
make it clear that the city of Man and the city of God suffer differently (10, 89). Because the 
entirety of humankind suffered the Fall of Man, all people are justly subjected to the world’s 
suffering; the only difference between residents of the City of God and those of the City of Man 
is the way in which they respond to suffering. It is thus that the City of Man, “in the same 
affliction [...] detests[s] God and blaspheme[s], while the [City of God] pray and praise. So 
material a difference does it make, not what ills are suffered, but what kind of man suffers them. 
For, stirred up with the same movement, mud exhales a horrible stench, and ointment emits a 
fragrant odor” (Augustine 10). The only way that the Roman pagans could change the way in 
which they respond to suffering is if God grants them election by giving them a new heart. 
Because He has not, they can only respond as the reprobate can, wickedly; however, even
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without their change of heart, God granted them longer life by protecting them with His 
sovereign mercy (Augustine 34).
In Book IV, Chapter IV, Augustine makes his infamous claim that unjust kingdoms are 
no different than a band of robbers. He recounts a tale of Alexander the Great meeting a pirate: 
when Alexander seized the pirate, “he asked the man what he meant by keeping hostile 
possession of the sea, [and the pirate] answered with bold pride, “What you mean by seizing the 
whole earth; but because I do it with a petty ship, I am called a robber, while you who do it with 
a great fleet are styled emperor” (Augustine 101). The pagans would reject this tale because they 
do not believe that the emperor is equivalent to the pirate; the pirate is clearly unjust because he 
has no backing from a just nation. The pagans’ view ascribes the enlargement of kingdoms to 
Jove (Augustine 105-107, 110). This claim is problematic to Augustine because historically, 
nations that have been raised up would have to have the same cause or else the gods are 
inconsistent for one of three reasons: either the gods are faithful to different people groups across 
time, they are weak and can be overcome by the humans they created or the gods have the power 
to overcome one another (103). Augustine then states, if these gods, whom the Romans 
worshiped, really had the power to preserve and increase the bounds of Rome, they would have 
increased the dominion of the Greeks instead because ultimately, the Greeks have always 
honored the pantheon better than the Romans ever did (121). Because these gods clearly do not 
have this power, it is by the hand of the true God that the Romans were allowed to rule the lands 
they did; if the true God was alone worshiped with sincere faith and virtue, the Romans would 
have a better kingdom and receive the eternal kingdom promised by God to His faithful 
followers (Augustine 121).
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Readers of the first five books will find that in Chapter XXI of Book II, Augustine 
provides Scipio’s definition of a political community. Like the discussion in Book IV, this 
discussion presumes Augustine’s views on the totally depraved state that humans are in. 
According to Scipio, the political community (i.e. the republic or the commonwealth) or “’The 
people’ [are] not every assemblage or mob, but an assemblage associated by a common 
acknowledgement of law, and by a community of interests” (Augustine 56). In other words, all 
of the people in the political community have a common sense of right that they share because 
there is a moral foundation that politics is built upon. In order for humankind to form political 
associations, there must exist a common moral foundation of some sort, otherwise justice is 
impossible. Scipio further qualifies the commonwealth by stating that “a republic, or ‘weal of the 
people,’ then exists only when it is well and justly governed, whether by a monarch, or an 
aristocracy, or by the whole people, [but when the governing body is unjust,] the republic is not 
blemished (as has been proved the day before), but by legitimate deduction from those 
definitions, it altogether ceases to be” (Augustine 56). Common morality, for Scipio, is necessary 
for the existence of the commonwealth; if morality is missing, then the commonwealth ceases to 
exist. If the reader considers Augustine’s view of the Fall of Man again in light of this 
discussion, then Rome, has ceased to exist as a viable commonwealth. At the end of this 
discussion, Augustine leaves a promissory note stating that he will return to complete the 
discussion at a later time; he redeems the note in the discussion found in Chapter XXI of Book 
XIX to answer the question: what does it mean that the commonwealth has ceased to exist?
The Two Cities and Their Ends
Book XIX is of greater importance to political scientists due to the fact that Augustine 
devalues politics and generates a new understanding of politics as a limited activity that retrains
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and maintains order -  it does not promote eudaimonia or happiness. This set of arguments is 
generated from the assumption that the ends of the City of Man pale in comparison to the ends of 
the City of God. For the first six pages of his argument, Augustine provides descriptions of the 
supreme good in leading philosophies among pagans -  all of these sects of philosophy ultimately 
constitute a significant part of the City of Man -  and following the descriptions, he then 
explicitly states that the supreme good of the City of God is life eternal (605-611). Opposite the 
City of God’s supreme good is the supreme evil which is death eternal -  “to obtain the one and 
escape the other we must live rightly. And thus it is written, ‘The just lives by faith,’ for [the City 
of God does] not as yet see [the] good, and must therefore live by faith,” and the only reason 
humans have the power to live rightly is due to the fact that God is the giver of faith to a select 
people (Augustine 611; cf Habakkuk 2:4). The City of Man, on the other hand, believes that the 
supreme good and supreme evil are found in this life and not the next; for the ancients, namely 
Varro, the highest good was realized through the use of politics to improve the city (605-611).
Augustine rebuts this common line of thinking with the Pauline letter of 1 Corinthians: 
“The LORD knoweth the thoughts of the wise, that they are in vain,” and it is by their “stupid 
pride” that they are blind to the true good (611, 613; 1 Corinthians 3:20). The reason the 
thoughts of the wise are vain is because they are ignorant of the true supreme good -  it is 
through their pride that they receive a false view of the highest good. Wisdom that supports the 
ends of the City of Man pales in its importance when it comes to the end of the City of God, 
which of course, is most important to St. Augustine. Furthermore, with all of the wisdom in the 
world, a person is still subject to the evil of this world -  the City of Man is never liberated from 
evil, and while the City of God makes its pilgrimage in this world, it is subjected to the vices of 
the flesh, just as the City of Man is (Augustine 612; Galatians 5:17).
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Similar to the way in which Augustine rebutted Pelagianism, his discussion about the 
depraved nature of man indicates that the ends of the City of Man are neither righteous nor 
correct. In fact, Augustine thinks it ridiculous to entertain the notion that humans can realize the 
highest good by their own will (Bourke 264-265). He does admit, however, that the philosophies 
that do accept the miserable state of this world are at least one step closer to the truth because 
they are not blinded by pride (613-614). While this is a humbler position for the City of Man to 
take, it is not helpful in distinguishing between those that are truly virtuous in God’s eyes and 
those who are not; true virtue is recognizable because it is seen in someone that has hope in the 
world to come -  it is clear that this individual has hope and is made happy by the hope of their 
salvation if they feel happy and safe in response to the evils of this world (Augustine 614-615; 
Romans 8:24). Because the philosophers of the City of Man do not know this hope -  as a result 
of their total depravity -  they fabricate the highest good and a notion of happiness upon a virtue 
that is ultimately deceitful and proud (Augustine 615).
For Augustine, the highest good ‒ which is peace ‒ can only be known and enjoyed by 
the City of God; he describes the peace as a reward that has been prepared for its members. 
Because the members of the City of God cannot escape these pains and temptations [of this life], 
they yearn for the “security where peace is complete;” eternity in the celestial city has no 
struggle against the vices because it is characterized by its complete incomprehensible felicity 
that “no adversary shall disturb” (Augustine 619). This security that Augustine is pointing to is 
the ultimate end of the City of God; peace is the end of the goodness expressed by the saints 
(620). This final peace is the one that believers wish to declare and look forward to ‒ the word 
‘peace’ doesn’t do justice to the “life eternal” that is promised because peace describes things of 
this world, not what is greater than this world (Augustine 620). Thus, the supreme good ‒ and the
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end ‒ of the City of God is “peace in eternal life, or eternal life in peace. For peace is a good so 
great, that even in this earthly and mortal life there is no word we hear with such pleasure, 
nothing we desire with such zest, or find to be more thoroughly gratifying” (Augustine 620). To 
justify this claim, Augustine explains that all humans and beasts want joy and peace: humans and 
beasts alike pursue peace in all endeavors (621). Those that make war or interrupt peace 
intentionally do so in order to create a peace that best suits their needs or desires; all beings, in 
one way or another, aim to satisfy their desires or their needs in an attempt to feel peaceful 
(Augustine 621-622). For Augustine, peace is an innate desire that all creatures in the world 
have; however, true peace is beyond comprehension for those that are living in the world because 
of the Fall.
Following Augustine’s logic, it is clear that the ends of the elect and the reprobate are 
going to be very different because the reprobate will pursue a lesser, temporal peace. The Fall 
caused individuals to seek to establish themselves over other humans in order to obtain the 
individual’s definition of peace (Augustine 622). Augustine states that this pride that people have 
in ruling others is a perversion of what God intended; all people are equal, under God, and 
seeking to rule others “abhors, that is to say, the just peace of God, and loves its own unjust 
peace” (622). This peace is fake and devalued because God, in his divine authorship, commands 
what true peace is, and what humans have done is pridefully establish their own ideas of what 
peace is through the use of politics; the peace of the state is temporal, and temporal peace is 
fleeting when considering eternity. Hence, politics is the means of achieving the peace and 
highest good of the state; however, this peace is not the means of achieving the highest good of 
eternal peace, it is a rough means of establishing peace and order amongst the unjust.
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It is in Chapter XXI of Book XIX that Augustine returns to the question left unanswered 
in Book II, Chapter XXI. Following Scipio’s line of reasoning in Cicero’s dialogue, Augustine 
argues that the City of Man isn’t a commonwealth at all because it lacks the necessary conditions 
for justice. Scipio states that a commonwealth or a “republic [is] the weal of the people. And if 
[Scipio’s] definition be true, there was never a Roman republic, for the people’s weal was never 
attained among the Romans. For the people, according to this definition, is an assemblage 
associated by a common acknowledgement of right and by a community of interests” (Augustine 
631). While this may seemingly prove that Rome is, in fact, a commonwealth, it does not 
because of Scipio’s view of what right is. Scipio explains at large that a “common 
acknowledgement of right” is shown through a republic that administers justice; however, where 
there is no true justice, there can be no right. [...] Thus, where there is not true justice there can 
be no assemblage of men associated by a common acknowledgement of right, and therefore there 
can be no people, as defined by Scipio or Cicero; and if no people, then no weal of the people, 
but only of some promiscuous multitude unworthy of the name of people (Augustine 631-632). 
Consequently, if the republic is the weal of the people, and there is no people, then it follows that 
there is no commonwealth where there is no justice (Augustine 632).
It is through the discussion of Book XIX, Chapter XXI that Augustine provides the 
proper vantage point for reading Books I-V. Because of Augustine’s view of the Fall of Man, the 
fall of cities through the actions of robbers and emperors is justly suffered by both the elect and 
the reprobate alike on account of the shared condition of sin amongst humankind. Neither the 
Greeks nor the Romans had true faith in Christ, so neither was rewarded; it is of the opinion of 
the pagans that nations are raised up on account of the virtues of a nation, but due to the fact that 
all humans are depraved, there is no such thing as a virtuous human will. Therefore, neither the
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practice of Christianity nor its adoption as the official Roman religion has anything to do with 
the Goth’s successful sack of Rome; it is simply another failure of a historical manifestation of 
the City of Man. Rome’s fall is unremarkable considering the way nations are raised up and fall 
across human history because God “gives earthly kingdoms both to good and bad [...] according 
to the order of things and times, which is hidden from us,” but is ruled over by Himself 
(Augustine 125). It is simply the way the City of Man has been designed to work. With that said, 
Augustine’s view of Rome’s existence, like every other great nation, is simply a gift from the 
merciful God to the reprobate (126). It is through the lens of Book XIX that the reader can 
properly read this theological rebuttal because ultimately, the end of every manifestation of the 
City of Man, along with all of its people, is death and destruction.
Augustine makes it clear that Rome does not possess the necessary conditions for justice; 
in the same way, neither does the City of Man. Therefore, neither Rome nor the City of Man has 
the capability to become a commonwealth. After rejecting Scipio’s definition of the people and 
the commonwealth, Augustine offers an alternate definition of a “people”. His new definition 
states that “a people is an assemblage of reasonable beings bound together by a common 
agreement as to the objects of their love, then, in order to discover the character of any people, 
we have only to observe what they love [...] and it will be a superior people in proportion as it is 
bound together by higher interests, inferior in proportion as it is bound together by lower” (637). 
The higher and lower interests of the people are derived from what those people love. For 
Augustine, all higher interests are those that result from obedience to God because those that “do 
not themselves obey God, as God has commanded them to serve Him, they have no proper 
authority over the body and the vices” (638). Without this proper authority over the vices, all 
interests are bom from a spirit of depravity, not the spirit of God. According to this new
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definition of people, the inhabitants of Rome are a people, and its “weal is without doubt a 
commonwealth or republic” (637). By redefining people, Augustine is now also redefining what 
the republic (or commonwealth) is too. Hence, the City of Man, because its weal is the welfare of 
the commonwealth and not in obedience to God, it is void of true justice (638). It is characterized 
by its fundamental desire to dominate others, and the root cause of this desire is the Fall of Man 
and the depraved nature apart from the redemptive grace of God; therefore, it is to be considered 
a commonwealth, but it is far from being a just and righteous one. Because Rome is not a just or 
righteous commonwealth, the best it can provide, as an ordered multitude, is temporal peace and 
physical security.
To wrap up Book XIX, Augustine states that God gracefully gives authority to the souls 
and reason of believers, so that they may rule over their body and vices; if God is not delivering 
humans from vices, then their supposed virtues are not true virtues because they are inflated with 
pride -  in fact, prideful virtues are counted as vices to God (638). This is all true because God is 
the sole provider of the life to human flesh and the blessedness of each life (638). Those who are 
alienated from God that have the peace of this world cannot enjoy peace in the end; however, it 
is in the interest of believers that the non-believers enjoy Earthly peace as long as the two cities 
commingle (638-639). People that are alienated from God are not like the humble person 
because the humble man submits “himself to God, his body to his soul, and his vices, even they 
rebel, to his reason, which either defeats or at least resists them; and also that he beg from God 
grace to do his duty, and the pardon of his sins, and that he render to God thanks for all the 
blessings he receives” (Augustine 639). These humble servants of God ‒ the City of God ‒ attain 
freedom from sin while God rules forever and grants them the supreme good of the peace in 
eternal blessedness; this is the ultimate end of the City of God (Augustine 640). Those that do
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not serve God ‒ the City of Man ‒ inherit eternal misery in the “second death;” the soul is 
eternally separated from its life source and the body is subjected to eternal pains (Augustine 
640). The second death is like an eternal war ‒ because it is the opposite of blissful peace ‒ 
between all opposing things in human nature (Augustine 640). God’s judgement at the end of 
time passes humans to these ends: the good, the City of God, to the supreme good and the evil, 
the City of Man, to the supreme evil (Augustine 640). With all this in mind, Augustine’s 
response to the pagans’ arguments in Books I-V is that they are simply receiving just punishment 
for their rejection of the god of Christianity. In the end, the City of God receives eternal security 
and felicity in the presence of God, and the City of Man receives the wrath of God that they 
incurred through their depravity (640).
Conclusion
As a whole, Augustine’s City o f God takes up the criticism of the Christian god laid out 
by the pagans, and through a very thorough collection of arguments he proves that the 
replacement of the worship of the pagan gods by the god of Christianity did not lead to the sack 
of Rome and that the fact that Rome collapsed on “God’s watch” cannot reflect poorly on Him. It 
is through God’s totally omniscience and sovereign choice that He dictates the trajectory of 
human flourishing. In order to effectively describe the divine order throughout his arguments, he 
sketches the two cities and their attributes, and he describes the ends they are both pursuing and 
the means they use to achieve them. Ultimately, both cities aim at the end of peace, but it has 
been made clear, through understanding his ontological assumptions that are scripturally 
informed, that the peace of the City of God is the only true peace. It has been ordained by God 
that attaining this peace is the highest good of humankind, and through its attainment, the City of
God finds liberation from the Fall of Man.
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Although this study has illuminated the necessity for reading Books I-V and Book XIX in 
light of one another, it is only a very small glimpse of the multitude of arguments that Augustine 
dives into amidst his massive twenty-two volume work. Even within the books discussed, there 
are many more arguments that can be explored; however, the fact of the matter is that it is 
absolutely necessary to read the entirety of The City o f God to have a complete understanding of 
the arguments he makes. In the same way, scholars ought to carry this into all academic pursuits 
in the humanities because misunderstanding is often a result of not seeing the full picture.
Wilcox 18
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